Ting Yao
My research interests include entrepreneurship, corporate governance, and strategic management. The primary focus is the board of directors. One stream of my research studies boards in VC-backed startups, including conflict dynamics, time horizon differences, board composition, and their impact on innovation and exits. Another stream emphasizes boards in public companies. I am particularly interested in subgroup dynamics on boards and their effects on various strategic choices. My other research on topical issues is driven by my diverse educational background. I have degrees in strategy & entrepreneurship, operations research & supply chain management, international business, and finance, which creates opportunities to collaborate with colleagues in different areas on crucial topics, such as income inequality, shareholder activism, gender diversity, and airline route design.
Please contact me if you would like to know more about one of the papers/projects below.
Publications
Yao, T., & O'Neill, H. (2022). Venture capital exit pressure and venture exit: A board perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 43(13), 2829–2848. Video Abstract (SMS Best Video Abstract of 2022)
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Wiley Top Downloaded Article (top 10% of SMJ papers published in 2022)
Yao, T. (2023). Antecedents of top management team and board gender diversity: A review and an agenda for research. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 31(1), 227-248.
Yao, T. (2024). Exit Pressure in Venture Capital. In: Cumming, D., Hammer, B. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Private Equity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
Selected Research in Process
Conflict Types and Conflict Resolution on Startup Boards
By interviewing entrepreneurs and multiple types of investors (investors in VC firms, family offices, and evergreen funds), the qualitative study investigates conflict types and conflict resolution on startup boards, especially between entrepreneurs and investors. This study shows that conflict arises due to disappointing performance, information asymmetry, diverse opinions, and different exit expectations (exit timing and exit size). Timely and transparent communication can effectively resolve the conflict. However, conflict triggered by different exit expectations is deep-rooted, hard to address, and often leads to recap or dissolution.
Human Capital on Entrepreneurial Boards and their Impact on Innovation and Exits
(Sponsored by the Strategy Research Foundation (SRF) Research in Strategic Management (RSM) Program)
The board of directors is crucial to the growth and survival of the startups. What is an effective board composition? The demand for human capital significantly affects director selection. This quantitative study focuses on board composition and investigates what human capital combination contributes to innovation and valuable exits. The answers are not as simple as having a complete skill set and diverse backgrounds. We observe that more entrepreneurs become investors, and more investors become entrepreneurs. The overlap of skills and backgrounds among directors is a characteristic of startup boards, which creates a need to examine the effective board composition.
Board Composition Following Sarbanes-Oxley: An Analysis of Coalitional Patterns
with Prof. Hugh O'Neill
Building on subgroup theory and using faultline analysis, we evaluate the similarity between directors on eight important characteristics (age, gender, race, nationality, tenure, Ivy League graduate, highest education level, and functional background) and estimate the subgroup composition on boards. By considering subgroup size, number, and subgroup members’ impact on key board committees, four types of boards are identified: CEO dominated boards, independent director dominated boards, balanced boards, and fragmented boards. We further test the effectiveness of three conventional governance practices from the board subgroup dynamic perspective on S&P 1,500 boards: increasing the proportion of independent directors, separating CEO-board chair roles, and increasing board diversity. The findings challenge these best practices, identify the obstacles in developing effective regulation, and provide insights into the reasons for the mixed results on the impact of independent directors, CEO duality, and board diversity on performance in the extant literature.
The Impact of Board Subgroups and Subgroup Memberships on Golden Parachutes Policy
with Prof. Hugh O'Neill
This paper investigates the adoption of golden parachutes with consideration of directors’ subgroup membership. The preliminary results show that subgroup memberships affect directors’ advocacy for golden parachutes. Specifically, having insiders not in the CEO subgroups significantly reduce the adoption of golden parachutes; while independent directors increase the adoption of golden parachutes, but the impact of independent directors in the same subgroup as CEO is much stronger than the impact of independent directors not in the CEO subgroup.